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LAW AND THE INTELLECTUALS*
JEROME HALL **

BYer,"INTELLECTUALS"
newspaperman, or philosopher who engages actively in politics.

I do not mean the European type of writ-

And although some intellectuals may also be experts, I shall not be concerned with expert knowledge. The principal problems of our times
lie elsewhere, especially because in a democratic society, experts should
not make the important decisions of policy, nor are they as well qualified
to do that as are thoughtful laymen who have a rounded view of life.
I am concerned, instead, with that much larger class of well-educated
persons who have a wide intellectual interest. My thesis is that the active
collaboration of these intellectuals is needed to solve the principal legalpolitical problems which challenge us, and that if their collaboration is
secured, the values of democratic civilization will survive and prosper.
We live in a political age. It is predominantly political not only because of the universal interest in politics, but also because of the importance of political controls in an age when the masses of the people must
somehow be taken into account as well as the powerful new technology.
In this combination of circumstances, the salient fact is the possibility
of the quick, utter annihilation of mankind. It is fortunate that most of
us do not dwell too long upon these realities and that the daily task engenders wholesome attitudes. But thoughtful persons cannot thrust
aside the principal challenge of their times. They must come to grips
with it.
The problem exists, and the challenge arises from the clash of values
which motivate human beings. There is nothing inherently evil about
airplanes, radios, and nuclear energy; indeed, they are among the most
valuable of human resources. But when the control of these forces is
in the hands of dictators who know how to manipulate mass opinion, we
face acute problems which cannot be exorcised out of existence or met
by exhortation.
Even in the democratic states, we are far from an ideal solution regarding the use of modern technology. But its most serious abuse is
excluded because of the basic values of democratic societies and their
methods of solving problems. The values center on the importance of
the individual personality, and the methods are rational ones. What is
distinctive about democracy is that both its values and its methods are
* An address to the Phi Beta Kappa Chapter, Indiana University, May 2, 1950.

** Professor of Law, Indiana University.
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protected and assured by law. In their legal institutions lie the uniqueness and the strength of democratic states.
The importance of democratic legal institutions is evident when one
considers that similar values are to some extent cherished in nondemocratic states. For example, there has been, or is, a deep sense of
individuality and a religiously oriented respect for personality in some
dictatorial states, and even freedom of speech may be valued. But in
democracies, these values are protected by the rule of law. Courts,
officials, and the might of the democratic state operate regularly in established legal institutions to assure the realization of the community's
values.
These values, which are apt to be taken for granted, include the security of the person, respect for personality, the privacy of the home, the
pursuit of a profession, the exchange of ideas, uncontrolled education,
and communication by newspapers and radio. Each of these values is
protected by definite laws. The criminal law, the law of torts, of contracts, property, constitutional, and other law provide powerful instrumentalities which safeguard these values. If any of them is interfered
with, the power of the state functions in legal channels to compensate,
redress, punish, and deter the recurrence of such violations. Moreover,
these laws are not something handed down to democratic people. They
are the discoveries and creations of the people, the slow accumulation
of centuries of free, thoughtful experience. The law of democratic societies is, thus, an expression of self-control.
The methods of making this law, in a larger sense than the term "legislation" usually suggests, and the methods of adjudication are rational
methods. The presupposition of the relevant philosophy is that there are
better and worse solutions to social problems; and legal methods, expressed in specified rules of pleading, procedure, and evidence, represent
rational ways of determining issues that concern violations of the values.
They are methods of arriving at sound solutions. When the citizen of a
democratic state gets into a dispute, he is content to abide by the process
of law because he also knows that the outcome will not depend upon the
whim or partiality or even the sound judgment of someone in power, but
that the rule of law functioning in rational channels will probably settle
the matter satisfactorily or, at least, that any alternative is much less
desirable. But there are always threats and frustrations, even in
democratic states. And when powerful forces arise in the world which
are not subjected to democratic controls, all values are imperiled.
Long before the atomic bomb was discovered, there were weapons and
bacteria potent enough to destroy humanity, although it would have
taken longer and'been less dramatic. There was, however, no universal
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slaughter, partly, no doubt, because no dictator or elite had a monopoly
of the instruments of destruction. In the democracies, there were also
unselfish, though no less potent, controls. Human beings, if the conditions Which develop normal personality exist, become social and rational
in sufficient degree to provide the necessary restraint. These conditions
and values lie at the foundation of the modem democratic state which
maintains an equilibrium between the individual's drives and the community's welfare. It combines the two forms of activity harmoniously
so that, by and large, the individual's best interests intermingle with the
best interests of the community. Although the equilibrium is sometimes
a precarious one, it is easy to understand and support its vital role in the
family, state, and nation. Solution of the present crisis in human affairs
,depends upon the extension of this understanding to encompass the entire world and upon our ability to strengthen and forge international institutions which assure not bare survival from aggression, but also the
values of democrdcy. As Socrates expressed it, not life, but "a good
life" is the objective.
If we are to get effective cooperation to achieve that goal and not merely tepid approval, it is necessary to persuade intellectuals that they have
a stake in the democratic legal order which is sufficiently valuable to secure their persistent active support. There would have been no need for
such persuasion in the democracy of ancient Greece. While there was
no legal profession in Athens, all intelligent Athenians were lawyers. All
male citizens, at one time or another, held governmental offices and participated in the trial of cases. The reverent attitude of the Ancient
Greeks towards their law is shown, for example, in Pericles' Funeral
Oration and throughout Plato's dialogues, where the law-giver is extolled far beyond military heroes and poets; indeed, he comes closer than
any other mortal to the ideal philosopher-king. In that relatively simple
environment, it is easy to recognize the basic function of law as the principal guide to the achievement and preservation of "the good life"-the
enjoyment of intellectual and spiritual values.
In the early years of the American Republic, we had a similar situation
here, with local government strong, contacts personal, and discussion
among thoughtful citizens and officials in small meetings a potent method
of arriving at sound decisions. But for some seventy-five years, concomitant with the vast expansion of the country, there has been a progressive weakening of such influence and methods. Distance, mobility,
and accelerated change have isolated the intellectual citizen and have
made him dependent upon specialists in law and politics. Indeed, it is
becoming all but impossible for intellectuals, who are not apt to be members of either trade unions or businessmen's associations, to exert any
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influence on the making of vitally important legal and political, decisions.
The complexity of affairs and the expansion of controls accentuate the
loss of the intellectual's influence. One need only refer to the law of
taxation, the growth of criminal law, and that of inheritance and the
regulation of business, including the media of mass communication, to
indicate the vastly increased influence of law and government on all of
us. Taxation, for example, has enormous effect on wealth, economic. incentives, public and private expenditure, and so on. It is equally true
that the conmplexity of these and many other laws and their administration raises difficult problems whose solution depends on the availability
and use of expert knowledge. But although the experts make an essential contribution, they cannot determine the goals and values which.
should be implemented.
While legal controls strongly influence the lives of all, the stake of intellectuals in sound law and government is greater than that of most
citizens. Intellectuals have a greater need to share in the economic prosperity of the country, which law and government strongly influence, because they desire university education, travel, and expensive entertainment, such as that provided by books, the opera, and the theater. But
these are only the more superficial aspects of the intellectuals' stake. To
be an intellectual, in the best sense of that term, means to appreciate the
so-called higher values in their various manifestations. It mdans sensitivity to the creations and discoveries of the best minds. More than that,.
it implies not only enjoyment of these values, but also their conservation
for future generations and, finally, a positive contribution to'increase'
these eternal goods. It follows that intellectuals thrive in a world which
permits such tastes and aptitudes to be pursued freely, without fear or
inhibition.
The dependence of cultural pursuits, research,. and communication on
the character of the legal order is evident in recent and current history.
In Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Communist Russia, there have been
not only relentless degradation of intellectual inquiry, but also brutal
banishment and slaughter of untold millions of intellectuals. - In Germany, physics was purged of non-Aryan elements, and in Russia, genetics
has been compelled to conform to Communist dogma. Artists and writers must follow the party line and, of course, newspapers and schools
are under strict censorship. Criticism of the government is a serious'
crime, and secret police, in closed hearings, judge and execute the dissident. It is all the more incumbent upon American intellectuals to keep
alive and to foster the humanities and pure sciences. But the principal
need is to appreciate the fact that there are conditions which permit such
pursuits to flourish, and those conditions are expressed and preserved
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in the legal order of democratic societies, which encourages their cultivation as ends in themselves. Accordingly, intellectuals, more than any
others, have a vital interest in a country and a world of law and freedom.
That is the intellectual's primary motivation; and the pertinent question
is-what can intellectuals do to preserve and expand the necessary conditions?
There is no simple answer to that difficult question. The extremely
unfortunate and dangerous situation which now isolates intellectuals from
the centers of legal and political power is aggravated by the specialization of knowledge that characterizes our culture. It is rare that even
intellectual laymen understand much about the legal order, and the most
important institutions are thus abandoned to the care of specialists and
the whims of chance.
Modern specialization has not only discouraged laymen from studying
law, it has also established a rigid departmentalization of knowledge in
which, for example, law and government are taught by separate faculties.
But the political process is expressed in, and becomes intelligible by reference to, laws and their administration. This is inevitable, because social
problems have duration and they recur; they, therefore, require more or
less permanent solutions, and that implies law. The dominance, during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of a formal view of law as
"commands of the Sovereign" influenced political scientists to turn their
inquiries towards purely factual issues and knowledge-e.g., to the study
of power, the statistics of elections, the organization of parties, the psychology of leadership, methods of propaganda, and so on. But in this
century, the current of jurisprudential thought, especially during the
past twenty-five years, has flowed in deeper, wider channels. Law is now
understood as a cultural fact, as the embodiment of factual processes,
and as the expression of social values. Moreover, law includes and represents rational efforts to solve problems. It represents relatively firm
social judgments regarding the solution of pressing issues; hence, the
neglect of the legal institution not only leaves political inquiry vague or
arbitrary, but by omitting the rational aspect of conduct, it also becomes
misleading and demoralizing.
The exclusion of law from liberal education and from the interest of
lay intellectuals also results from the persisting opinion that law is technical. But that is a great exaggeration, and if the whole corpus juris
is considered from the principal viewpoints which have engaged the attention of thoughtful intellectuals through the ages, it is evident that
only at the periphery are law and the knowledge of it technical. It becomes clear that law is technical only from the viewpoint of the qualifica-
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tions to practice law and that this does not affect the r6le or opportunities
of intelligent citizens.
Throughout western civilization, law has been important in three
fundamental contexts, the first and oldest of which are situations concerning obedience to a government. Here, the moral validity of the
commands of the State was and is of paramount importance; and in the
philosophy inaptly termed "Natural Law," which developed in this perspective, the rightness of the government's commands is essential to their
being "law." Second, there is the perspective of the legal scientist who
is interested in the operation and effects of law, the interrelations of law
and other variables, and so on. The legal scientist requires a factual
subject matter, and that is found in the behavior of persons in legally
significant situations. And, third, there is "lawyers' law," where the
primary question concerns the likelihood of action by the state with reference to particular persons and transactions. Here, at least initially,
neither the moral validity of law nor its operation in fact is of primary
concern. The pertinent question is-has the State issued certain commands? In democratic states, however, all three perspectives and types
of influence intermingle to determine the quality of the most important
parts of "lawyers' law." Although the distinctions noted remain important for many purposes, the lawyers' law of democratic states is in
large measure morally valid and popularly supported. Since it has
arisen from the free discussion and free action of the community
rather than from coercion or imposition, it is apt to embody defensible
social values and to reflect current knowledge. Accordingly, the principal
ways of improving such a legal order concern the deliberate application
to it of empirical knowledge and sound critical evaluation.
How can the universities contribute to this? Specifically, how can the
colleges give their students a greater understanding of law and legal institutions than they now receive? Presumably the need could be met
by departments of government; but other disciplines are relevant to legal
problems, and current specialization, as noted, is also often a bar to such
an apparently simple solution. In some universities, legal scholars are
urging that the colleges add certain courses in law to their curricula. But
it is not surprising to find little enthusiasm for what seem to be rather
practical law courses. Indeed, since American legal scholars have brought
legal education to a high vocational pitch, as compared, for example, with
university legal education in Britain, it is little wonder if academic scholars are apprehensive that the introduction of law courses into college
curricula may have a similar effect on liberal education.
The solution, it seems to me, is not to offer diluted law courses in the
colleges, but to provide courses in cultural legal history and in the science
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and philosophy of law. Some legal scholars are available to participate
in such a venture as are some historians, anthropologists, political scientists, economists, and psychologists. The objective would be not to impart practical information about rules of law, but to impart knowledge
of the fundamental principles, methods, and functions of law. If such
projects enlisted the cooperation of scholars representing various disciplines or, preferably, of scholars who have devoted themselves to relevant interdisciplinary study, liberal education would gain very significantly. Let me indicate some of these possibilities of making important
contributions to liberal education.
A cultural legal history would place the history of law in social-economic-political contexts. It would focus on the functions of law in
relation to human needs and aspirations in different periods, the interactions of law and other evolving institutions-e.g., the impact of the
Industrial Revolution, and the dependence of legislation and adjudication upon the contemporary store of knowledge, as well as the contributions made to that knowledge by legal agencies. Within some such
framework, various special problems would be explored, for example, the
rise and operation of a system of precedent, changes in the modes of
trial and fact-finding, and the growth of legal terminology to attain objectives under varying historical pressures. Such a cultural legal history
could illuminate important current problems, for example, by revealing
the painful and heroic struggles which were required to assure the civil
liberties that are expressed in our Bill of Rights.
A cultural history of law would contain descriptions of specific events,
so selected and organized as to provide a concrete background for the
more general types of inquiry included in the philosophy and science of
law. Here, again, the objective of the course in the philosophy and
science of law would be not to communicate practical information about
rules of law, but to increase theoretical knowledge of a fundamental type.
The opportunities provided by appropriate instruction in the philosophy
and science of law are unique because of the inclusiveness of the subject matter. For example, the oldest classification of knowledge in westem culture is the three-fold one: physics or, rather, empirical science,
ethics, and logic. In terms of subject matter, we have, consequentlyfact, value, and formal relationships. In numerous courses in the college
curriculum, scientists investigate facts, logicians explicate formal relations, and ethicists discuss values. In some of them, unavoidably, more
than one perspective operates; and, no doubt, some scholars have introduced various dimensions of thought into their disciplines. But in the
philosophy and science of law, one cannot avoid dealing with any of the
basic dimensions or their fusion in a comprehensive union of meanings
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and institutions that require interdisciplinary study. Moreover, the sanctions of law include physical ones-hence the ethical issues are of the compelling type that is paramount today in the nation and internationally.
Perhaps the simplest illustration of how these types of subject matter
and experience are expressed in law is that of a criminal law and its
references. Thus, "one who deliberately kills a human being" refers
to events and actions-types of fact. "Shall be punished" thus and so,
also refers to certain facts. But joined in a rule of law to the above
description of a social harm, it also embodies a moral judgment. Finally,
that entire proposition exhibits a distinctive structure and, in relation to
other propositions in a penal code and that expressing the finding of a trial
court, it has formal significance. Whether the substance of a legal rule
refers to a labor problem, infringement of a patent, the paternity of a
child, personal injury, or any other of the innumerable events and transactions which concern the legal order, the need for accurate fact-determination and for use of the best relevant empirical knowledge is evident.
And since every rule of law is in its entirety a normative judgment signifying, also, what must be done under the circumstances, it is equally
apparent that the need for critical evaluation is invariably present.
In view of the fact that colleges have long sought to construct a curriculum which would provide a broad synthesis without sacrificing the
critical disciplined work that accrues from intensive study of narrow
fields, it is worth repeating that the proposed science and philosophy of
law would supply an inclusive view that is lacking in the current severe
departmentalization of study and knowledge. For, what is unique about
law is not its separate components of fact, value, and form, but its fusion
of all three in a single unity. If one reflects on the implication of this, for
example, in relation to the classification of knowledge, it becomes clear
that a thorough study of the fundamental processes and functions of law
not only requires close attention to the various departments of knowledge;
much more important, it also requires a synthesis of that knowledge, a
bringing-together into significant juxtaposition of the various types of
knowledge, empirical and moral, to bear on the solution of important
problems. It may be possible to achieve a similar synthesis elsewhere.
I know of none that is as feasible or as important for intellectual citizens
as that whose subject matter is the law of a democratic society. If these
citizens can thus recapture Plato's insight into the significance of sound
law as the avenue to the good life and his estimate of the law-giver as the
wisest of mortals-realizing what that implies in terms of knowledge
and virtue-they may succeed in preserving the kind of world in which
intellectuals can thrive.
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The dependence of effective leadership upon an informed citizenry
suggests that the extension centers of the universities might be expanded to perform certain important functions in which intellectuals could
participate. The extension centers are now used principally to provide
university training. But what of the masses of people who, by lectures
and discussion, could be informed regarding the great issues of the times
and the knowledge that is relevant to their solution? A forum for working people, farmers, and women, that heard able speakers and in which the
educated citizens participated could, over a period of time, produce a
public opinion which was informed and helpful to the leaders in the solution of serious problems. Anyone who has reflected on "the revolt of the
masses" which is characteristic of this century, though he may repudiate
the cynical versions of that thesis, will appreciate both the need and the
vast potentialities of imaginative adult education.
Although college curricula and adult education are primarily problems
of the universities, their alumni could undoubtedly influence and assist
their expansion and improvement. There are other simpler methods of
developing intellectual interest in law and government. In discussion
groups, clubs and societies, and reading groups, programs of informal
studies could be arranged which would probe much more deeply than is
usual into important legal-political problems along lines suggested above.
And there remains the most important method of all-that of self-education.
It is evident from the magnitude of the tasks suggested that the legal
profession alone cannot perform the indicated functions. At best, lawyers can serve only as special conduits, using their skills to bring some
of the available knowledge to the solution of the community's problems.
Indeed, because of the dominant vocationalism of legal education, the
number of lawyers who can do that is small. But even if we had many
statesmen-lawyers of the type Plato had in mind, that is, many masters
of the methods of increasing and using interdisciplinary knowledge, they
would still be dependent not only upon experts, but also, and even more,
upon lay intellectuals whose knowledge, experience, and judgment are
essential to solve the most difficult problems.
It is also vitally important to assist lawyers in their efforts to perform
tasks which are sometimes very unpopular. For example, in democratic
countries there are constitutional guarantees of fair trial, the presumption of innocence, the right of every person accused of a crime to be represented by a lawyer, and other safeguards. Although the duty to discharge these functions rests directly on the legal profession, pressures
from a hostile community which does not appreciate the value of basic
constitutional guarantees raise serious, sometimes insuperable, obstacles.
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It is both unfair and short-sighted to act as if the entire obligation to
make the constitutional protections effective rested upon lawyers, for they,
like other individuals, have personal problems and needs. Thoughtful
citizens can understand the value of the constitutional guarantees and the
significance of legal procedure as an implementing form of rational inquiry. They can understand the importance of the social functions of
lawyers in a democratic society and appreciate the fact that lawyers are
carrying on the community's business. They can lend the support of an
informed opinion which renders the effective discharge of those duties
feasible.
What I have been urging depends in large measure upon the cultivation of a philosophy of law which is relevant to the pressing problems
of our times. If one wishes to construct a platform upon which the free
thoughtful people of all countries can stand, where can one turn for more
likely timber? The peoples of the world differ in their language, history,
religion and economic organization, as well as in their particular politicallegal institutions. Science and morality are the two spheres that promise
most in terms of potential universality; and the exigencies of the times
require that they be focused upon law and legal institutions. In that direction lies the possibility of rational, decent control of the powerful
forces of the present age. That, in one form or another, is the principal
question of all law-making and administration; and the philosophy of a
morally valid legal order offers the widest perspective in which that problem can be solved. On that platform the intellectuals of East and West
can stand and will stand-if they are permitted to do so-because there
it is possible to transcend the particularities of national cultures and to
arrive at common decisions which will assure the future of democratic
civilization.
9 Journal of Legal Ed.No.1-2

